Anne M. Burke
SPRINGFIELD — Rejecting a laundry list of challenges brought by multiple doctors, the Illinois Supreme Court today upheld a law that permanently revokes the medical licenses of health-care workers convicted of certain crimes.
In a 17-page decision authored by Justice Anne M. Burke, the court unanimously ruled that while the law “may yield harsh results” for the plaintiffs — who were convicted of sexual abuse and battery against patients but had since gotten their licenses reinstated — it was properly enacted by the General Assembly and did not violate due process or res judicata.
The decision affirmed a ruling by Cook County Associate Judge Franklin U. Valderrama as well as an opinion from the 1st District Appellate Court authored by Justice Thomas E. Hoffman.
Lawmakers in 2011 changed a statute to mandate permanent revocation of health-care licenses for any worker who “has been convicted” of battery, forcible felonies or a crime requiring registration as a sex offender, among others.
The doctors challenging the decision were Bradley Hiroshi Hayashi, a chiropractic physician convicted in 2007 of misdemeanor battery for inappropriately touching a patient; Nercy Jafari, a physician convicted in 2001 of misdemeanor sexual abuse for inappropriate touching; and Mohammed Khalleeludin, a physician convicted in 2000 of misdemeanor battery stemming from sexual misconduct with patients.
All three had their licenses temporarily suspended over the offenses. After the law took effect in August 2011, they received notices from the state indicating their licenses were being taken away permanently.
Despite the plaintiffs’ contention there was no clear intent by the legislature to apply the punishment to crimes adjudicated before the law was enacted, the high court ruled the language of the law “clearly indicates” such intent.
Because the phrase “has been convicted” is in the present-perfect tense, the court noted, it refers to action beginning in the past and continuing to the present.
That phrase “thus refers to health care workers who hold the status of having been convicted of a particular offense, no matter when that status was obtained,” Burke wrote.
Had the General Assembly only meant for the law to apply to convictions after the law went into effect, she added, it would have clearly done so.
“For example, the [a]ct could have stated that a licensed health care worker who ‘is convicted’ of a particular crime is subject to mandatory revocation of his or her license,” Burke wrote.
“Alternatively, the [a]ct could have included limiting language to indicate that only convictions after a certain date would expose workers to revocation of their licenses.”
Next, the court ruled the law did not violate any of the due process challenges posited by the doctors.
Despite the doctors’ contentions that new punishment should not be issued for actions they were already punished for, the court said the law doesn’t actually apply retroactively because it doesn’t change the criminal penalties that came with their convictions. Nor does it outlaw behavior that was legal at the time, the court ruled.
“Moreover, the [a]ct has no effect on plaintiffs’ right to practice their health care professions prior to … the [a]ct’s effective date,” Burke wrote. “An amended statute which creates new requirements to be imposed in the present or future, and not in the past, does not have a retroactive impact on the parties.”
Additionally, the court ruled that while the law restricts the doctors’ right to pursue their profession, the legislature has broad authority to regulate medical licenses, and the law need only pass the rational-basis standard to be validated.
The law is indeed rational, the court ruled, because it protects the public from those who are not authorized to practice or have previously breached the public’s trust.
Burke wrote that the court was well aware the application of the law to the plaintiffs might be unsympathetic, but it is within the legislature’s power to invoke such penalties.
“We are cognizant that application of the [a]ct to plaintiffs may yield harsh results by permanently barring plaintiffs from using their medical licenses or practicing their chosen professions,” she wrote.
“However, it is not a matter for this court to question the wisdom of the General Assembly in establishing licensing requirements, nor to determine whether it has chosen the best available means to achieve its desired result.”
The doctors also argued that Section 22 of the Medical Practice Act of 1987 shielded their licenses because it provided for multiple statutes of limitation to commence disciplinary action. The time limits had elapsed in two of the doctors’ cases.
But the language of that law says the time limits apply only to proceedings governed by that statute, whereas the revocations in this case were governed by Section 2106-165 of the Department of Professional Regulation Law.
“The time-bar defenses on which plaintiffs rely have no applicability to revocation proceedings under [S]ection 2105-165, which does not contain a statute of limitations or statute of repose,” Burke wrote.
As a final due process matter, the court rejected the plaintiffs’ claim that the law violates procedural due process because it does not allow for a hearing after the revocation procedures have commenced.
The law allows medical professionals to contest their license revocation in writing, by arguing there was a clerical error or proving their conviction had been vacated or overturned.
However, the law does not allow them to contest their innocence in a new hearing — and it doesn’t have to, the court ruled.
“We presume … that licensees convicted of a qualifying offense have received due process in the underlying criminal proceedings, during which they had the opportunity to contest the factual and legal bases for their criminal charges, present evidence, question witnesses, and present grounds for appeal,” Burke wrote.
Finally, the doctors argued that their previous suspensions by the Department of Professional and Financial Regulation made their new, permanent suspensions invalid due to the legal doctrine of res judicata — the idea that the same matters should not be relitigated.
Burke noted that even if the court assumed the regulators’ decision was “judicial in nature” — one of the conditions for the principle to apply — the facts surrounding the doctors’ first license-suspension are different than those surrounding their more recent, permanent suspension because of the different laws involved.
“While res judicata may bar the [d]epartment from disciplining plaintiffs’ licenses again under the Medical Practice Act based on their convictions, res judicata does not preclude the [d]epartment from revoking plaintiffs’ licenses pursuant to [S]ection 2105-165,” Burke concluded.
Another doctor, Angelo Consiglio, had also been part of the challenge in the lower courts. But he did not file a petition to the Supreme Court because he retired to Florida, said Dennis M. Doherty, a sole practitioner in Chicago who represented the doctors.
Doherty said this morning that he had not read the opinion in full yet, but he heard the result and is planning on appealing to the U.S. Supreme Court.
“We respect that court,” Doherty said, referring to Illinois’ top justices. “But they are not the court of last resort.”
Attorney General Lisa M. Madigan’s office represented the state. A spokeswoman said the office was still reviewing the opinion, but it is “pleased with the outcome and our initial assessment.”
The case is Bradley Hiroshi Hayashi, D.C., et al. v. Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation, Nos. 116023, 116163, and 116190.